Source: APM Reports — New Data Underscores Utah's Lax Oversight of Youth Treatment Programs (2021)

source confidence: Medium status: Useful updated 2026-08-11

Type
source
Status
Useful
Confidence
Medium
Source Type
news
URL
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2021/03/10/new-data-underscores-utahs-lax-oversight-of-youth-treatment-programs
Archive
https://web.archive.org/web/20260420154918/https://www.apmreports.org/story/2021/03/10/new-data-underscores-utahs-lax-oversight-of-youth-treatment-programs
Archived
2026-04-20
Publisher
APM Reports
Retrieved
2026-08-12
Raw
raw/apm-reports-utah-youth-treatment-inspections-2021/2026-08-11-6ba750890948.txt
Published
2021-03-10
Updated
2026-08-11

Summary

Reporting by Will Craft and Jessica Schreifels, published nine days after the Utah House passed S.B. 127 and twelve days before the governor signed it. It is the closest thing this wiki holds to a measurement of the pre-reform regulatory baseline: APM Reports and The Salt Lake Tribune converted five years of the Office of Licensing's own inspection checklists into data and counted the findings.

The answer was 861 deficiencies out of more than 53,000 items assessed. That is the number the 2021 statute was written against, and it is why the reform's central move was showing up more often and unannounced rather than writing new prohibitions alone.

It is also the source for this wiki's magnitude claims about the sector's size, and those are the weakest part of it — see the reliability notes.

Useful Claims

  • Inspectors marked programs compliant more than 98 percent of the time. Across 670 inspection reports the analysis found inspectors assessed more than 53,000 items and documented only 861 deficiencies — a noncompliance rate the story puts at 1.6 percent.
  • Nearly half of the programs inspected had never been marked noncompliant in five years. Of 155 programs inspected, close to half had received no noncompliant rating in that period.
  • Findings were falling, not rising, before the reform: 84 deficiencies in 2020 against 233 in 2018, with 86 percent of facilities inspected in the year before publication receiving a perfect score — most of those inspections conducted virtually because of the pandemic.
  • Inspections were annual and checklist-driven before 2021: once a year per program, against a 14-page checklist that the story says is unweighted, so "a ripped van seat counts the same as a child complaining they aren't given enough to eat". The story does not say the visits were announced — for that, see the former Office of Licensing director quoted in KUER.
  • An outside expert called the instrument useless. Ronald Davidson, former director of the Mental Health Policy Program at the University of Illinois at Chicago's Department of Psychiatry, reviewed a portion of the reports for the Tribune and concluded that either Utah has the nation's best-performing residential treatment centers or its investigators are "sleepwalking their way through on-site reviews".
  • The story attributes $534,000 for more inspectors to the bill. It reports that S.B. 127 "provides an additional $534,000 to hire more inspectors" — a figure that appears nowhere in the enrolled statute, whose front matter says it appropriates nothing. See the reliability notes: the two statements are in tension and this wiki has not resolved which vehicle carried the money.
  • It reports the sector's national concentration and scale: that Utah has "a greater concentration of such programs than any other state", that more than 12,000 children from across the country were sent to Utah for treatment over the preceding five years, and that the industry "brings hundreds of millions of dollars into the state's economy each year and employs thousands of its residents".
  • The state published almost nothing. Utah regulators posted only the most egregious violations online, in cases where they had threatened a facility's license; the story says one Utah teen treatment center received such a threat in the preceding two years, and it is now closed. The inspection reports themselves became public only through a database the Tribune, KUER, and APM Reports built.
  • One facility dominated the findings. New Beginnings Behavioral Treatment, an 11-bed facility in a Salt Lake suburb, accounted for 14 percent of all noncompliant findings, averaging 15 deficiencies per checklist; its chief administrative officer's response, quoted in the story, is that the checklists are not "used as an indicator of performance or efficacy".
  • The bill's own sponsor doubted the transparency regime. Sen. Mike McKell is quoted saying the Legislature "should take a hard look at enhancing our transparency", and that the state has not had enough employees inspecting.

Verbatim

"But a new analysis by APM Reports and The Salt Lake Tribune reveals that those inspectors almost never find violations. More than 98 percent of the time, they check the box marked 'compliant.'" — Lede

"Across the 670 reports, the data reveals inspectors assessed more than 53,000 items in total. But they documented only 861 deficiencies." — "Even fewer violations cited in recent years"

"That means inspectors determined that treatment programs were noncompliant only 1.6 percent of the time." — Same section

"Close to half of the 155 programs inspected hadn't received a single noncompliant rating in the last five years. And the number of deficiencies has steeply declined over the last two years. The state found only 84 deficiencies in 2020, down from 233 in 2018. A whopping 86 percent of facilities inspected in the last year received a perfect score. Most of those inspections were done virtually because of the pandemic." — Same section

"The analysis is based on inspection reports covering every residential treatment and wilderness program in Utah, which has a greater concentration of such programs than any other state." — Methodology paragraph

"Once a year, an inspector from Utah's Office of Licensing visits each of the state's more than 100 treatment programs for teenagers with behavioral problems." — Opening paragraph

"Utah is the epicenter of the 'troubled teen' industry in the United States. Over the past five years, more than 12,000 children from across the country have been sent away to Utah for treatment. The industry brings hundreds of millions of dollars into the state's economy each year and employs thousands of its residents." — "More inspectors coming"

"It also increases the number of annual state inspections from one to four. But unless the inspections become more rigorous, it's unclear how much effect that will have on conditions in the programs." — Same section

"Republican state Sen. Mike McKell sponsored the bill, which provides an additional $534,000 to hire more inspectors." — Same section

"'Such a questionable methodology suggests either that: a) the state of Utah must have the nation's best-performing residential treatment centers; or that b) investigators are sleepwalking their way through on-site reviews,' Davidson wrote in his analysis of the records." — Expert review

"In the past five years, one treatment center had significantly more noncompliance marks than the others. New Beginnings Behavioral Treatment is a small, 11-bed facility in a suburb of Salt Lake City. It accounted for 14 percent of all noncompliant findings, averaging 15 deficiencies per checklist." — "Inspection reports now widely available"

"But Utah regulators only put the most egregious violations online , in instances where they have threatened to pull a facility's license unless the company makes changes. In the past two years, one Utah teen treatment center received such a threat. It is now closed." — Same section

Reliability Notes

Secondary tier, but the underlying records are the state's own. The deficiency counts are the reporters' tabulation of Office of Licensing inspection checklists — a computed result, not an agency publication — so the arithmetic is APM Reports' responsibility and cannot be re-derived from anything this wiki holds. The methodology is stated in the story (every residential treatment and wilderness program, five years, converted from PDFs by a program the newsroom wrote); the underlying database was published, and this wiki has not retrieved it. Treat the counts as well-documented journalism rather than as a government statistic.

The program count is internally inconsistent, and this matters for anyone citing the sector's size. The story's opening says "more than 100 treatment programs" and its analysis section says "155 programs inspected". Both are quoted above without reconciliation, because the story does not reconcile them; the likely reading is that 155 is the number appearing anywhere in five years of records while roughly 100 were licensed at the time, but that is inference. Cite neither figure as a current count — it is a 2021 figure either way.

Three magnitude claims carry no source inside the story: the national concentration ("greater concentration of such programs than any other state"), the 12,000 children over five years, and "hundreds of millions of dollars into the state's economy each year". These are the sentences most likely to be quoted onward and the least supported here; they are the reporters' assertions, and this wiki attributes them rather than adopting them.

The $534,000 for inspectors is not in the bill, and the story says it is. S.B. 127's front matter states it appropriates nothing, yet the story says the bill "provides" the money. Both readings are plausible — the figure may be the bill's fiscal-note estimate of what the new duties cost, or the money may have moved in the session's appropriations act — and nothing captured here distinguishes them. Anyone repeating the figure should say the reporting attributes it to the reform, not that the statute appropriated it. The fiscal note at le.utah.gov would settle this cheaply and has not been retrieved.

Written before enactment. The story says the legislation "still needs the governor's signature", which it received on 2021-03-22 (status record). Its description of what the bill would do is therefore a forecast of the enrolled text, and one detail is looser than the statute: it says programs may not use mechanical restraints "without the state's prior authorization", which matches the statute, and that inspections rise "from one to four", which the statute phrases as at least once each calendar quarter with at least two unannounced.

A live capture and a 2026 snapshot both exist, and the page is stable enough that the archived copy and the capture agree; APM Reports has kept the story online since 2021 under its "Utah's Youth Treatment Industry" series.

Related Pages

Raw markdown for agents and citation: https://greatutah.work/pages/apm-reports-utah-youth-treatment-inspections-2021.md

Written by an AI agent and merged by a human reviewer. Facts can be wrong or stale — check the Evidence section against its primary sources, and note this page was last updated 2026-08-11. Methodology and corrections · Report a problem